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COMMENT ON TREASON TRIAL OF ONE POSSESSING
DUAL NATIONAITY
In a recent case, before the United States Supreme Court the fol-
lowing facts appeared: Petitioner was born in the United States
of Japanese parents. He lived in the United States until he was
18 years of age and then went to Japan to study. War broke out
between the United States and Japan while Petitioner was still in
school there, and he remained to finish his course of study. Upon
reaching his majority, he registered in the Koseki, a family census
register, and had his name removed from the list of enemy aliens in
the police records. He changed his address from California to Japan
and procured a position as an interpreter in a Japanese war plant,
which plant was under the supervision of the army, and was manned
partly by american prisoners of war. Petitioner was convicted of
treason in the United States District Court and his conviction was
affirmed. The conviction of treason was based on evidence of un-
necessary cruelty to the american prisoners to get more work from
them which was the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy. The
Petitioner contended, that at the time of the alleged treasonous acts,
he felt no allegiance to the United States and had thrown his lot
with Japanese war effort. The Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the conviction on the grounds that even if Petitioner was
possessed of dual nationality, he still owed such allegiance to the
United States as would make his acts constitute treason. 1
The Constitution of the United States define the crime of treason
in the following terms: "Treason against the United States shall
consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort".2 This provision applies
only to those persons owing allegiance to the United States at the
time the alleged treasonous acts took place,8 for treason is a breach
of allegiance and can be committed only by him who owes allegiance
either perpetual or temporary.4 Aliens may be guilty of treason
against the United States, for while they are domiciled within our
borders they are equally amenable with citizens for any infraction of
our laws. s These are the persons who are meant when the courts
speak of temporary allegiance.
1. Kawaldta v. U. S .............. U. S ............. 96 L. Ed. 799 (1952).
2. CoNsr. oF U. S., Art. 3, § 3.
3. U. S. v. Wiltberger, 18 U. S. 76, 52 L. Ed. 37 (1820).
4. Young v. U. S., 97 U. S. 39, 24 L. Ed. 922 (1877).
5. Carlisle v. U. S., 83 U. S. 147, 21 L. Ed. 423 (1872).
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"Expatriation" is the voluntary renunciation of nationality and al-
legiance6 and has been upheld by the courts of this country from a
very early date. The founders of this government had the question
of expatriation in mind, for Thomas Jefferson said, "Our citizens
are certainly free to divest themselves of that character by emigra-.
tion, and other acts manifesting their intention, and may then be-
come subjects of another power, and free to do whatever the subjects
of that power may do.7 Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the
Supreme Court of the United States said that even if one is a citi-
zen of this country by birth, he has the right to expatriate himself
and become a citizen of any other country which he may prefer, if
it is done with a bona fide and honest intention, at the proper time,
and in a public manner".8 While we are inviting all the people of
the earth to become citizens of the United States, it surely does
not become us to adhere to a contrary doctrine. 9 This statement was
made in 1804 but it is as true today as then, for we still stand ready
to accept immigrants from all parts of the world with the exception
of the Far East. Congress, by an act adopted July 27, 1868, de-
clared, "The right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of
all people, indispensible to the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness," and provides, that "any declaration, instruc-
tion, opinion, order, or decision of any officer of this government
which devises, restricts, impairs, or questions this right is hereby
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the government".' 0,
The trend of american thought seems to have always been to favor
the free and unlimited rights of a citizen of the United States to ex-
patriate himself. This view is summed up by Mr. Fish, Secretary of
State under President Grant, in a letter to Mr. Washburn, Minister
to France, in 1873. He said, of protection which the United States
would give its citizens abroad; "There are other cases in which
voluntary expatriation is to be inferred, not from an open act of
manciation, but from other circumstances, that a purpose of a change
of allegiance may be reasonably assumed". 11
Both the crime of treason and the act of expatriation requires an
intent on the part of the one acting. The courts of the United States
6. Savorgnan v. U. S., 73 F. Supp. 109, 111 (D. C. Wis. 1947).
7. 4 J4rr. WORxs, 37 (1793).
8. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 CRANcH 64, 120, 2 L. Ed. 208
(1804).
9. Id.
10. II WHARTON, INT. LAW DriLsT, § 171, p. 309; 8 U. S. C. § 800 (1907).
11. III Moor*, INT. LAw DIGEsT, 712; I U. S. FomoN R L., 1873 at
256, 258 (Dept. of State ............ ).
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have said that expatriation is a matter of intent on the part of per-
son concerned, which must be shown by some express act;12 and
that not only must allegiance be owing at the time of the act, but it
requires an intent to commit treason, which intent, if lacking, keeps
the acts from constituting treason.18 The word "intent" referred
to an act denotes a state of mind with which the act is done.1 4 In
other words, "intent" is a mental attitude made known by acts.15
Treason, as defined by the United States Supreme Court, embraces
the existence of both a state of mind and the commission of overt
acts. Both must be present. It is conceivable that one under the
domination of folly or of factional feeling or directed by a preverted
view of what he is doing, or even a wrong-headed conscience, may
do what would otherwise be traitorous acts, and yet not expose him-
self to that charge because the acts, although carrying all the conse-
quence of traitorous acts, even done without traitorous purpose or
intent.
16
The act of expatriation to be effective, should be bona fide and
manifested by at least the act of his removal to another country,17
but a citizen of the United States cannot throw off his allegiance to
his native country as a cover for fraud, nor as a justification for the
commission of a crime against the country, or for a violation of its
laws, when this appears to be the intention of the act.18 But, once
one has bona fide expatriated himself, he no longer owes allegiance
to the United States, 19 and therefore may not be guilty of treason.
In the United States, from a very early date, we have adhered to
the principle that one is free to expatriate himself by his own volun-
tary acts. It is an historical fact that one of the major causes of
the War of 1812 was the fact that the British were impressing sea-
men from the United States vessels because she claimed that such
seamen were English nationals. England claimed this right because
she maintained the doctrine of perpetual allegiance and considered
a renunciation of citizenship by English subjects as criminal. 20
It is true that a native-born citizen cannot, during his minority,
12. Schaufus v. Atty. Gen. of U. S., 45 F. Supp. 61, 66 (D. C. Ind. 1946);
Perkins v Elg, 307 U. S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 1320 (1939).
13. Cramer v. U. S., 325 U. S. 1, 89 L. Ed. 1441 (1944).
14. Shotwell v. Nicollet Nat. Bank, 43 Minn. 389, 45 N. W. 842, 844 (1890).
15. People v. Haxer, 144 Mich. 515, 108 N. W. 90, 91 (1906).
16. U. S. v. Werner, 247 F. 708 (D. C. Pa- 1918).
17. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U. S. 133, 1 L. Ed. 540 (1795).
18. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U. S. 283, 5 L. Ed. 454 (1822).
19. U. S. ex rel Baglivo v. Day, 28 F. 44 (D. C. N. Y. 1928).
20. III Mooi , INr. LAW DIGEST, § 431, p. 552.
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renounce allegiance to the United States,2 ' but a child of an alien
who is taken back to the country of the parent during minority must,
upon attaining his majority, elect which nationality he will retain.P
To retain his United States citizenship, the person, as soon as he
reaches his majority, should do some act consistent with such inten-
tion.23 Of course, one cannot return to the United States from a
country at war with them, but the fact that actions are taken consis-
tent only with a renunciation of citizenship and a retention of the
citizenship of the parents seems to indicate overwhelmingly that an
election is made to adhere to the other allegiance.
Not only must one have attained his majority before he may ex-
patriate himself, but congress, in 1907, passed an act which provides
that no citizen of the United States may expatriate himself during
a time of war.2 4 The petitioner in this case was a minor when he
returned to Japan and therefore, under the law, could not renounce
his allegiance at that time. When he attained his majority, Japan
was at war with the United States and he could not expatriate him-
self. As has been set out, the method of expatriation of a minor,
born in the United States to alien parents and later taken back to
the country of his parent's nationality, is by an election whether or
not to retain his United States citizenship. It seems to this writer
to be a hardship, not contemplated by congress, placed on one holding
a dual allegiance and wishing to retain one in preference to the other.
It is natural for one, who has elected to retain the nationality of a
country at war with the other country of his dual allegiance, to do
his utmost to further the ends of the chosen power. It would seem
to indicate even more strongly that the election had been made.
The court in the case at hand remarked that the Petitioner was
using the claim of expatriation as a means of escaping the hang-
man's noose; but in the light of the facts reported, it logically appears
more probable that the true story was the one advanced by Petitioner
in the trial, and that the statement of events and intention related
previously for the purpose of getting a United States passport and
a reinstatement of citizenship was fabricated. We can very easily
conclude that the motive for his acts between 1943 and 1945 was to
help the war effort of the country to which he believed he owed his
complete allegiance, while the other was one concocted to cover true
intention of expatriation.
21. U. S. ex rel Baglivo, supra, note 19.
22. Perkins v. Eg, 307 U. S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 1320 (1939).
23. Id.
24. In re Grant, 289 F. 814 (D. C. Cal. 1923).
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The crime of treason and the act of expatriation both require
an intent on the part of the one acting. The intent for either act
should be gathered from those self-same acts. In this case, because
of the feeling by the jury against the acts of Petitioner, they appear
to have taken a series of acts which have but one inference, that the
Petitioner's allegiance to the United States had been renounced, and
use them to substantiate the crime of treason. The court looked upon
the fact of registering in the Koseki and having his name removed
from the files of the police as an enemy alien as only publishing a
preexisting status; but these acts, with the ones which followed,
seems to imply conclusively that Petitioner had thrown his lot with
Japan, and therefore no longer considered himself a citizen of the
United States.
W=LY M . CRAM.
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